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Schulman and Pitt: Joint Custody

SECOND THOUGHTS ON JOINT
CHILD CUSTODY: ANALYSIS OF
LEGISLATION AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR WOMEN
AND CHILDREN*
Joanne Schulman··
Valerie Pitt···
There is cUrrently a growing and disturbing national trend
away from the traditional sole custody resolution toward awarding custody of children to both parents jointly.l This trend is
most visible in state legislatures where, in less than three years,
almost every state has considered joint custody legislation.The trend toward joint custody represents a significant
change in legal and mental health professional theories regarding child custody. Heretofore, stability and continuity in the
child's family environment were the primary factors governing
custody determinations. a However, under joint custody the continued relationship between the child and the noncustodial parent becomes paramount.· This shift in emphasis is remarkable
• c 1981. National Center on Women and Family Law, Inc., 799 Broadway, Room
402, New York, N.Y. 10003.
•• Sta1f Attorney, National Center on Women and Family Law, Inc.
... Law Student, Hofstra University School of Law, New York
1. Freed & Foster, Diuorce in the Fifty States: An Overview as of August I, 1980,6
FAIl. L. REP. (BNA) 4043,4047 (1980); see 0180, Foster & Freed, Joint Custody: A Viable
Alternative, 15 'I'luAL MAGAZINE, May 1981, at 26, 27 [hereinafter cited as Viable
Alternative).
2. See infra Section n. This article was originally prepared in July 1981. The status
of legislation and statutes has been updated as of March 1982.
3. Annot., 92 A.L.R.2d 699 (1950); Moninger v. Moninger, 202 Neb. 494,499, 276
N.W.2d 100, 104 (1979) (one of the primary objectives after the dissolution of a marriage
is to create a stable atmosphere for the children). See 0180 In re Lang, 9 A.D.2d 401, 193
N.Y.S.2d 763, aff'd, 7 N.Y.2d 1029, 200 N.Y.S.2d 71, 166 N.E.2d 861 (1960) (upholding
traditional regard for stability).
4. Memorandum in support of S. 7964/A. 9369, 203th Legis., 1980 Seas. (New York's
first joint custody bill) (failed). See also CAL. elV. CoDB § 46OO(a) (West Supp. 1982)
(legislative finding and declaration that it is the public policy of the State to assure
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in light of the fact that there have been no reliable studies and
little is known of the effects of joint custody on children.a
Joint custody is not a new concept. In the past it was
viewed with caution and as an exception to the traditional sole
custody resolution. Today, legal experts still acknowledge that,
because joint custody requires divorced spouses to cooperate and
interact on an ongoing basis, only a small percentage of families
qualify for it.- By contrast, the current joint custody trend seeks
legislatively to mandate joint custody as the u norm," if not preferred, resolution. This shift in policy absent studies on the effects of joint custody on children is ill-advised and suspect.
The purpose of this article is to review and analyze joint
custody legislation and its implications for future custody litigation. However, discussion of joint custody must include an
awareness of who its proponents are and their motivations, as
well as the effect it will have on the lives of women who remain
the primary caretakers of children, for u[i)n the background of
the arguments over joint custody lies the age old 'battle of the
sexes' and the current change in lifestyles."" That the current
joint custody trend is a bacldash to the feminist movement and
women's struggle for an identity in addition to that of mother
and homemaker becomes apparent from an analysis of the legislation being introduced and enacted in the name of joint
custody.
I. THE LEGAL MEANINGS OF "JOINT CUSTODY"
The legal term "custody" generally denotes both legal and
physical custody. "Legal" custody is the right or authority of a
parent, or parents, to make decisions concerning the child's upchildren "frequent and continum, contact with both puente after the parente have separated or dissolved their marriage"), and CAL CIV. CoM I 46OO(b) (West Supp. 1982)
(parent which is more likely to allow "frequent and CODtilluing contact" with noncustodial parent is a factor to be considered ill determilliDg which parent is to be awarded
sole custody).
o. Foster & Freed, Joint Custody: Legialatiue Re/orm, 16 TJu.u. MAOAZINB, June
1980, at 22, 27 (hereillafter cited as Legialatiue Re/orm]i J.B. v. A.B., 242 S.E.2d 248,
255 (W. Va. S. Ct. 1978)i Williama v. Williama, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 26, 1981, at 10, coL 4
("[T]here is no definitive evidence to demonatrate that BUch concepts are generally viable in that it provides the beat basis for the health development of the child.").
6. Viable Altematiue, supra note I, at 31.
7. Legislative Reform. supra note 5, at 27.
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bringing. e Legal custody includes the right to make decisions regarding the child's residency, education, religious training, medical care, discipline, etc.· The legal custodian has the right to
institute legal action on behalf of the child and to enter into
settlements or contracts on behalf of the child. 1o .Physical custody is the right to physical possession of the child, i.e., to have
the child live with the physical custodial parent. The physical
custodian is charged with carrying out the day-to-day responsibilities of childrearing. l l A legal custodian does not, by definition, have to be the physical custodian in order to retain and
exercise decision-making authority or rights. 11
During the ongoing marriage and prior to a court order,
both parents have equal legal and physical custody rights; they
stand as co-custodians. Upon divorce or separation, the traditional resolution of child custody matters by courts has been the
"sole custody-visitatipn" order, wherein one parent (the custodial parent) is vested with the legal and physical custody of the
child. This parent, while given the exclusive decision-making authorityor rights, is concurrently charged with the full responsibilities for the day-to-day care of the child (i.e., physical custody). The other (non-custodial) parent's rights with respect to
the child are generally limited to "visitation."11 That parent's
responsibility is basically financial support of the child in the
8. Id. at 24j Nielson, Joint Custody: An AlternatilJe for DilJorced Parents, 26
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1084. 1087 (1979).
9. Burge v. City and County of San Francisco, 41 Cal. 2d 608, 617. 262 P.2d 6, 16
(1953)j Dodd v. Dodd. 93 Misc. 2d 641, 647, 403 N.Y.S.2d 401, 408 (1978)j See also Abarganel, Shared Parenting After Separation and DilJorce: A Study of Joint Custody, 49(2)
AM. J. OtmtOPSYCH. 320 (1979).
10. Burge v. City and County of San Francisco, 41 Cal. 2d 608, 262 P.2d 6 (1953).
11. Bruch, Making Visitation Work: Dual Parenting Orders, FAM. L. ADvoc., Summer 1978, at 22j Nielson, supra note 8.
12. Trompeter v. Trompeter, 218 Kan. 535, 545 P.2d 297 (1976). See infra note 31
and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., CAL. ClY. CODE § 4601 (West 1970) and HAWAII REv. STAT. § 571-46
(Supp. 1981) which provide the noncustodial parent with "reasonable visitation righte."
See also Rabbino, Joint Custody Awards: Toward the DelJelopment of Judiciol StandtJrds, 48 FORDHAM L. REv. 105. 110 (1979). That this "right of visitation" is solely a
"right" and not a "responsibility" was made clear in Louden v. Olpin, 118 Cal. App. 3d
565, 173 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 601 (1982). The Louden court
held that a child could not compel her non-custodial father to visit her. Some experte
have' questioned visitation law that provides for the right to visit without 8 reciprocal
responsibility to visit. See Benedeck & Benedeck, Post-DilJorce Visitation: A Child's
Right, 16 AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCH. J. 256 (1977); Bruch, supra note 11, at 24.
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form of court-ordered child support payments.· t Traditionally,
the actual day-to-day care of the child satisfied the mother's responsibility to the child, with fathers alone held legally responsible for their financial support. However, most states now hold
both parents equally responsible for the financial support of the
child, 111 without ascribing value to the custodial parent's nonmonetary contributions.
The rights and responsibilities of parents under a joint custody order are not clearly delineated, as are those under sole
custody. The term "joint custody" has been used to describe
everything from "joint legal custody" to "joint physical,"
"shared," "dual," "divided," "alternating" and "split" custody.·e

A.

LEGAL AND PHYSICAL JOINT CUSTODY

Although terminology varies, there are basic attributes commonly ascribed to "joint custody." Generally, joint custody is
broken down into "legal" and "physical" custody. Joint "legal"
custody· connotes parents' equal legal rights, or authority, to
make the vital decisions afi'ecting the child's life. 17 Joint "physical" custody indicates parents' alternating "physical care and
living time with the child,"11 that is, equal responsibilities.
Since joint custody legislation usually does not distinguish
between "joint legal" and "joint physical" custody, one would
assume that the term "joint custody" implies equal responsibil14. But see CHILD SUPPORT-WHDlI Is IT?, 7 SIWICH, A RaPoRT rOR TID URBAN

(1977) which reports that more than two·fifths of the divorced, l!eparated and
single women entitled to receive child support have never received any payments. Inter·
estingly, "fathers' rights" groups have publicly acknowledged the withholding of support
as an appropriate reaction to an "improper visitation lIChedule." Ruaaell, Father, Haue
Feelings, Rochester Time·Union, June 15, 1978, reprinted in Equal Rights for Fathers of
New York State, Inc., Newsletter, Dec. 1978, at 3.
15. "Today in the majority of states, statutes impoee the obliptioD of child support
on both parents, rather than considering It to be the primary obliption of the father."
Freed & Foster, supra note I, at 4054.
16. Bruch, supra Dote 11; Ramey, Stender" Smaller, Joint Cwtody: Are Two
Homes Better Than Onef, 8 GoLDBN GATS UNIV. L. RBv. 659, 560 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Ramey); Woolley, Shared Cwtody, 1 FAM. ADv., Summer 1978, at 6; Annot., 92
A.L.R.2d §§ 1·14 (1950).
17. Fain, Custody of Children, 1 CAL. FAM. LAWYBR 539. 564 (1962) (Continuing Ed·
ucation of the Bar).
18. Levy & Chambers, The Folly of Joint Cwtody. 3 FAM. ADv., Spring 1981. at 6,
INSTITUTE

9.
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ity for the day-to-day care of the children. In fact, most joint
cUstody court orders and legislation expressly provide the opposite. 1t Legislation in Massachusetts, for example, provided for a
presumption "that legal custody . . . shall remain equally with
and be equally shared by both parents . . . independent of the
residential and the shared living arrangements of the minor children:"·o Joint custody "presumption" legislation in Pennsylvania stated that "while actual [joint] physical custody may not be
practical or appropriate in all cases, it is intended that both parents have an opportunity to guide and nurture their children,
and to meet the child's needs on an equal footing, beyond the
considerations of support or actual physical custody. ,,.1
The equal sharing of responsibility by parents fares no better when joint custody is by court order. While "fathers' rights"
groups and other joint custody proponents tout the succeBB of
the California joint custody "experience,'''· Judge Billy Mills of
the Los Angeles Superior Court points out that "[t]he bulk of
these [joint custody] awards-perhaps 95 percent-specify joint
legal custody rather than joint physical custody.'''·
Many supporters of the joint custody concept only define it
as joint legal custody; joint physical custody is not even envisioned as part of the concept: "Some judges and attorneys are
supportive of the concept of joint custody. On closer examination, however, they are still operating under the assumption that
there would be a primary home and a primary parent, with liberal visitation rights for the other parent. This is not joint
custody."N
Joint legal custody is particularly common when courts
19. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4O-4·9.1(c) (Supp. 1981).
20. H. 1877, S. 2077, 1982 Reg. Seas. (Mass. 1982) (emphasis added). See Appendix

B.
21. S. 141, 166th Reg. Seas. (Pa. 1982), (emphasis added). See Appendix B.
22. See Cook, Joint Custody, Sole Custody: A New Statute Reflects A New Per·
spective, 18 COUNCIL. CTS. RBv., June 1980, at 31, 33·34; Cook, California Retires a
Formula for Injustice in Child Custody Fights, L.A. Times, Jan. 6, 1980, pt. v. at 3, col.
I, reprinted in Equal Rights for Fathers of New York State, Inc., Newsletter, March
1980, at 12.
23. Dullea, Weighing the Importance of a Joint Custody lAw, N.Y. Times, April 27,
1981, at C·19, col. 2.
24. Levy & Chambers, supra note 18, at 10.
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want to avoid labelling the noncustodial parent unfit.1I While
this may be "joint custody in name only,"le the legal rights and
responsibilities of the parents are affected. Further, confusion
surrounding terminology and parents' rights works to the detriment of the child. Children suffer as they become pawns in the
hands of parents vying for control over the child. I? As Levy and
Chambers point out, "ultimately, when the first crisis arises, the
duplicity of terminology will result in exactly what the courts do
not want-a return by the parents for enforcement, interpretation or reversal as a post-decree or appellate matter.''S8
Unfortunately, court resolution of terminology has not been
forthcoming. Despite the apparent decision-making authority
vested in legal custodians, a California court held that an award
of joint custody to both parents with physical custody in the
mother· constituted an abuse of discretion, since these terms
overlapped and became "ephemeral and essentially meaningless."11 The court found that remand for redetermination of
"joint custody" was unnecessary since the "physical custody"
award in fact gave the mother "custody."" Thus, the effect of
the trial court's award was to vest all legal custodial rights in the
physical custodian. On the other hand, in acknowledging the significance of a legal custody award, courts have also found physical custody not to be determinative. In Trompeter v.
Trompeter,ll the court concluded that the legal custodian (the
father) exerted adequate decision-making authority over the
child to constitute "custody," despite actual physical custody in
a non-related third party.

B.

FREQUENTLY USED JOINT CUSTODY TERMS

Once beyond the "legal" and "physical" qualifications of
joint custody, ambiguity and confusion again abound. "Alternating,"'1 "shared,"" and "dual,"" custody are only a few of the
25. Dodd v. Dodd. 93 Misc. 2d 641. 645. 403 N.Y.S.2d 401. 406 (197S); Levy &
Chambers. supra note 18. at 8-9.
26. Dodd v. Dodd. 93 Misc. 2d 641. 645. 403 N.Y.S.2d 401. 406 (1978).
27. Levy & Chambers, supra note 18. at 10.
28.Id.
29. Neal v. Neal. 92 Cal. App. 3d 834. 841, 155 Cal. Rptr. 157. 163 (1979).
30.Id.
31. 218 Ken. 535, 545 P.2d 297 (1976).
32. Bratt, Joint Custody. 67 Ky. L.J. 271. 282 (1978-1979).
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terms used interchangeably with "joint" custody. "Divided" custody often signifies the alternating of sole custody between the
parents, where each parent has physical and legal custody of the
child for a designated time period. 811 Some of the most common
arrangements are a nine and three month division based on the
school calendar, or a six month division."
The term "divided" custody has also been applied to a
"split" custody arrangement." However, a "split" arrangement
generally means that siblings are divided up between the parents and each parent maintains sole custody of the child or children awarded to him or her." Once the "split" has been made,
the principles of sole custody govern.
Although some authorities claim that the di1ferences in terminology are basically semantic, a, these variances produce confusion and obscure the legal rights and responsibilities of parents, to the possible detriment of the child.
II. SURVEY AND ANALYSIS OF JOINT CUSTODY
LEGISLATION

A.

TYPES OF JOINT CUSTODY LEGISLATION

As of March 1982, 24 states have joint custody statutes.40
Over the past two years, joint custody legislation has been introduced in almost every other jurisdiction,41 and amendments to
strengthen existing joint custody statutes have been introduced
in California, Connecticut, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts,
33. Woolley, supra note 16.
34. Bruch, supra note 11.
35. Cox & Cease, Joint Custody: What Does It MeanY How Does It WorkF 1, FAIl.
Aov., Summer 1978, at 10, 11.
36.Id.
37.Id.

38. A. LINDNEY, SEPAl\ATlON AGREEMENTS AND ANTB-NUP'I'W. CoNTRACI'S 14-60 (rev.
ed.1977).
39. Ramey, supra note 16. But see Legislative Reform, supra note 5, at 23-24 ("The
terms 'joint' or 'shared' custody have taken on different meanings from state to state and
even in the courts of the same state.").
40. Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas and Wisconsin. See Joint Custody Statlttes, Appendix A for citations.
41. See Joint Custody Legislation. Appendix B for a list of states and full citations.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1982

7

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 3 [1982], Art. 2

546

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:538

Minnesota, Nevada, Ohio, Oregon, and Texas." This spate of
joint custody legislation in less than three years is surprising
when compared with the fact that it has taken more than twenty
years for thirty-seven states to move from the "tender years" (or
"maternal presumption") doctrine to a gender-neutral "best interests of the child" doctrine. fa
Most of the current joint custody legislation does not appear problematic at first glance. Proponents usually claim that
the legislation merely provides the court with the option of
awarding joint custody!· However, an examination of the enumerated and implied provisions, and the impact of these provisions on custody disputes, reveals that most of the legislation is
at best unnecessary, and at worst inimical to the best interests
of children and the parent charged with the day-to-day responsibilities of childraising.
There are four types of joint custody bills: (1) joint custody
as an option; (2) joint custody as an option only when parties are
in agreement; (3) joint custody upon the request of one party;
(4) joint custody "preference" and "presumption."

1. Joint Custody as an Option
The simplest form of joint custody statute provides that
"the order may include provision for joint custody of the children by the parties."" Under this type of statute, the court is
42. See Appendices A & B for citations.
43. E.,., While the "best interests" standard first appeared in California's custody
statute in 1931 (1931 Cal. Stat. ch. 930, § I), it was not until 1972 that all presumptions
were deleted and the "best interests" standard was stated in gender-neutral terms. See
CAL. Cw. CODE § 4600 (West Supp. 1982). As of September 1980, all but four states had
incorporated the "best interests" standard into their custody laws. 6 FAM. L. RaP. (BNA)
4057 (1980).
44. See, e.,., Dullea, Wei,hi", the Impact of a Joint Cwtody Law, N.Y. Times,
April 27, 1981, at C-19, col. 2, interpreting the New York joint custody bill as simply
providing courts with the" right to award joint custody if both parents agree." However,
the bill in fact included a joint custody presumption, court authorization to malte awards
on either party's request, and consideration of "frequent and continuing contact" with
the noncustodial parent 88 a primary factor in a sole custody determination. In rebuttal,
see Cohen, Mischiellous Bill on Joint Custody, N.Y. Times, May 19, 1981, at A-14, col. 5
(Letters to the Editor).
45. IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.21 (1981) (emphasis added). States with "option" statutes
are Connecticut, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, MinnelOta, Montana, North Carolina, Oregon and Pennsylvania. See Appendix A, col. A.1 for citations.
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expressly granted the power or authority to award joint custody.
Although a few statutes do not include reference to the "best
interests" standard, most provide for joint custody as an option
"if it appears to the court that joint custody would be in the
best interests of the chUd . . . .".8
The major drawback of the "option" statute is its failure to
set adequate limits or standards on the court's' power to order
joint custody. It permits the court to opt for joint custody as an
easy out, as a means of "escap[ing] an agonizing choice, to keep
from wounding the self-esteem of either parent. . . to avoid the
appearance of discrimination between the sexes."47
Under this type of statute, it is possible for a court to force
joint custody on parties who are not in agreement or who have
not considered the consequences of a joint custody award and
arrangement.·· As most experts agree, opposition by one parent
to joint custody is antithetical to the concept itself, if not to the
best interests of the child." Joint custody forced upon two hostile parents can create a dangerous environment for a child, such
as conflicting directives to physicians with respect to medical
care, or to educational institutions regarding education.1IO The
child's immediate needs will be prevented from having prompt
resolution while emergency decisions await court resolution of
the dispute between the joint custodians.
The "option" statute may create more problems than it
solves. The lack of directives or guidelines to the court increases
the likelihood that joint custody will be ordered in inappropriate
cases.
46. NEV. REv. STAT. § 125.140(1) (1981). See also Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky, Montana
and North Carolina statutes. (citations in Appendix A).
47. Dodd v. Dodd, 93 Misc. 2d 641, 403 N.Y.S.2d 401, 402 (1978).
48. See Adler v. Adler, 51 A.D.2d 694, 379 N.Y.S.2d 408 (1976) (ordering joint custody although neither party sought it). As two commentaton note, "legal edicts cannot
force parents to agree on child rearing questions." Levy & Chamben, supra note 18, at 8.
49. "Joint custody ... cannot succeed ... when imposed upon parents who are
irrevocably opposed to it and who refuse to give the cooperation joint custody requires."
Legislative Reform. supra note 5, at 24; see also Miller. Joint Custody. 13 FAM. L.Q. 345.
369 (1979).
50. See. e.g.• Levy & Chamben. supra note 18. at 8.
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2. Joint Custody as an Option Only when Parties Are In
Agreement

A few states permit a court to order joint custody only when
the parties are in agreement. III The Texas statute expressly allows parties to enter into a written agreement providing for joint
custody.III The court still retains ultimate authority since it must
approve the parties' agreement and find that it is in the best
interests of the child. However, because parents can agree to
joint custody and make such an arrangement for the child without a court order, the court's role as final arbiter becomes meaningless; these parents will have joint custody regardless of a
court order. "Many share equal rights and responsibilities in decision-making and care-taking of their offspring, even though legal custody has been granted to one or the other parent. In these
instances, the parents have made an emotional and moral commitment to their children . . . . "118
Although New York does not have a joint custody statute,
case law permits joint custody awards only when the parties are
in agreement. 1I4 In Braiman v. Braiman,III the New York Court
of Appeals reversed the trial court's forced joint custody order.
The court noted that, despite a four-year separation, the parties
remained unable to contain their "ill-feelings, hatred and disrespect" for each other and had been unable to work out even a
limited visitation schedule. lit Ordering a new hearing, the court
held that joint custody is "insupportable when parents are severely antagonistic and embattled."II.,
This "option only when parties agree" statute is the best of
the joint custody legislation. It comports with the findings of
51. KANSAS STAT. ANN. § 6O·1610(b) (1976)j LA. Crv. CODa ANN. art. 146·147 (West
Supp. 1982); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 299, § 31 (1981)j OHIO REv. CODa ANN. § 3109.04 (Page
1980); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.06(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982)j WIS. STAT. ANN. §
247.24(1)(b) (1981). Connecticut's newly amended statute only permits awards of "joint
legal custody without awarding joint physical custody where the parents have agreed
merely to joint legal custody." 1981 Conn. Pub. Acts 81-407, I 2(b) (to be codified at
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN § 466-56 (Supp. 1982 & 1982 app. IIUpp.).
52. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.06(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
53. Levy and Chambers, supra note 18, at 9. See aiso, Arbarbanel, supra note 9.
54. Braiman v. Braiman, 44 N.Y.2d 584,378 N.E.2d 1019,407 N.Y.S.2d «9 (1978).
55. 44 N.Y.2d 584, 378 N.E.2d 1019,407 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1978).
56. [d. at 590, 378 N.E.2d at 1026, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 451.
57. [d. at 587, 378 N.E.2d at 1023, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 449.
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most experts that these are the only appropriate cases for joint
custody.
However, problems can arise even under this type of legislation. A parent who does not believe joint custody is in the child's
best interests may be forced into accepting such an "agreement"
out of fear that she or he will stand at a disadvantage and lose
sole custody in a contested trial. This is particularly a problem
when the custody statute requires that the court consider, as a
factor in determining sole custody, which parent would provide
greater access of the child to the other parent.at The parent
seeking joint custody appears "friendlier" and would therefore
receive preference in the sole custody award. I.
To date, these statutes and legislation do not require courts
to make an inquest into whether the parental joint custody
agreement was made knowingly and voluntarily. Because of the
potential for court approval of agreements made under duress or
coercion, some bar associations have actively opposed this type
of legislation:
Moreover, the bill would give a preference to joint
custody if the parties so agree, but it does not
provide a· mandatory inquest into whether the
agreement was knowing and voluntary. It· is
widely reported among the defense bar that husbands are applying, or threatening to apply, for
joint or sole· custody in order to bargain for a reduction in alimony and/or child support. This
bill's preference without mandatory inquest
would encourage the use of joint custody applications purely as a tactical weapon."

Another family lawyer noted: "[T]his bill does not provide a
mandatory inquest into any agreement wherein the parties had
agreed to preference of joint custody and thus, many wives
might be forced into giving up sole custody as a result of coer68. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600 (West Supp. 1982); MONT. REv. CODE ANN. § 40-4223(2) (1981). See Appendices A & B, col. B-1.
59. For a discussion of this "catch-22," see "Friendly Parent Provisions," infra notes
75-92 and accompanying text.
60. COMMITJ'EE ON THE FAMILY COURT, NEW YORK COUNTY LAWYERS' Asg'N, REPORT
No. 81-A (June 1981) (submitted in opposition to and recommending disapproval of, S.
3255A, A. 4166A, 204th Legis. 1981 Seas. (New York) (available at 14 Vesey St., New
York, N.Y. 10007).
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cion and/or duress, without the court having knowledge of the
same."61
3. Joint Custody Upon Request of One Party

This type of statute allows the court to award joint custody
"on either parent's application" or request. 61 Most authorities
agree that joint custody is only appropriate and in a child's best
interests when both parents agree to such a plan and are capable
of joint decision-making regarding the child's welfare.61 This
type of joint custody legislation is antithetical to the above criteria since the court can force joint custody on those parents who
are not in agreement or who have not shown themselves capable
of co-parenting. Legal edicts cannot force parents to agree on
childrearing questions. Nor can the fate of children rest on the
possibility of success:
Legal orders cannot be predicated on good
intentions, but must take into account existing
facts and behaviors. A joint custody award should
not rest on the ultimate hope that successful coparenting may result. When all available evidence
indicates that the parents cannot agree that the
sun will come up in the morning, much less on the
handling of their children, a joint custody order
will not change anything.If

This type of statute is extremely dangerous when it is coupled with a "friendly parent" provision. 611 The parent requesting
joint custody over the opposition of the other parent is given an
unconscionable bargaining lever. A parent who does not believe
61. Letter from Lester Wallman, Chair of Committee on Legislation, New York
Chapter of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, to Robert L. Schack, Esq.
(May 28, 1981) (regarding New York S. 325M, A. 4166A) (on file at National Center on
Women and Family Law, 799 Broadway, Room 402, New York, N.Y., 10003).
62. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600.5 (West Supp. 1982); HAWAU REv. STAT. §§
571.46·.46.1 (Supp. 1982); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 722.23(5)(a) (Supp. 1982); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 40-4-224 (1981); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 458.17 (Supp. 1981); 1981 Pa.
Laws, No. 115 (to be codified at PA. CoN. STAT. ANN. § 23.1001-.10015). See also legislation introduced in New York and South Carolina, Appendix B, col. A.3.
63. Gaddis, Joint Custody of Children: A Divorce Decision-making Alternative,
WASH. ST. BAR NEWS, March 1978, at 10, 12-13; O'Neil & Leanoff, Joint Custody: An
Option Worth Examining, PERCEPTION, Nov.-Dec. 1977, at 28.
64. Levy & Chambers, supra note 18, at 8.
65. See infra notes 75-92 and accompanying text. See auo statutes cited, Appendix
A, col. B-l.
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joint custody would be in her or his child's best interests is put
mto a negotiating position of either "accepting" joint custody or
risking the 1088 of custody altogether in a contested trial.
Ironically, a parent who is least fit for the custody and care
of a child benefits the most from this type of statute. A parent
opposed to joint custody might be more willing to risk loss of
sole custody if she or he feels that the other parent is capable of
providing sufficient care for the child. However, the parent opposed to joint custody cannot, and probably will not, take that
risk when an award of custody to the other parent would not
provide minimally sufficient care for the child. Thus, the more
"unfit" the parent requesting joint custody, the more bargaining
leverage that parent gains under this type of statute.
4. Joint Custody Preference/Presumption

Joint custody "preference" statutes" prioritize available
custody resolutions and mandate that joint custody must be
given first consideration by the courts. Under a presumption
statute,'" joint custody is presumed by law to be in the best interests of the child. Thus, sole custody can be ordered only when
the "presumption" is rebutted by evidence proving that joint
custody is detrimental to the child's best interests. Many of
these bills declare joint custody to be the norm, and that it is to
be encouraged as an express public policy of the state."
66. See, e.g., Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Michigan, Nevada, New Hampshire, and
New Mexico statutes (citations at Appendix A). While CAL. CIV. CODS § 4600 (West
Supp. 1982) appears on its face to give equal weight to joint custody and sole custody
("to both parents jointly or to either parent"), it has been interpreted and touted as a
joint custody "preference." See Cook, Joint Cwtody, Sole Cwtody: A New Statute Re/iects a New Perspediue, 18 CONClL. Ora. REv., JUDe 1980, at 32.
67. California was the first state to incorporate a joint custody presumption. See
CAL. CIV. CODS § 4600.5 (West Supp. 1982). See also 1981 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 81-402;
FLA. STAT. § 61.l3(2)(b) (West Supp. 1981); IDAHO CODS ANN. § 32-717B (Supp. 1982);
MICH. Co..... LAWS ANN. § 722.23(6a)(2) (Supp. 1981); NEV. REv. STAT. § 125.240 (1981);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN § 458.16 (Supp. 1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4O-4-9.1(A) (Supp. 1981).
"Presumption" legialation has been introduced in Alaska, Illinois, KanB88, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina
and the District of Columbia. See Appendix B for citations.
68. E.g., CAL. CIV. CoDS § 46OO(a) (West Supp. 1982) states that it is the state's
public policy to 8B8ure "frequent and continuing contact with both parents ... to encourage parents to share the rights and responsibilities of child rearing." See also S.
3255B, A. 4155B, 204th Legis., 1981 Seas. (New York, introduced Feb. 23, 1981) (vetoed
by the Governor).
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While the degree of weight accorded joint custody differs
under "presumption" and "preference" statutes, the effect of
these statutes is basically the same: Joint custody becomes the
norm and is assumed to be appropriate for all or most cases.
Sole custody is relegated to an exception that is appropriate and
to be considered only after the court has decided against joint
custody.
To date, most express joint custody presumptions are limited to those cases where parents have agreed to joint custody.··
However, these statutes also include provisions that (1) permit
joint custody upon the request of one party and (2) give preference in sole custody to that party requesting joint custody.fO The
practical and combined effect of these two additional provisions
is an implied joint custody presumption in all cases. Should a
parent opposed to joint custody "agree" out of fear of losing custody altogether at trial, this "agreement" then becomes entitled
to the express presumption.
[A] parent involved in a custody dispute might
pressure the other parent to agree to an award of
joint custody, not because it is in the child's best
interests, but rather to avoid a contest for custody
. . . . In such a case, the presumption of joint
custody when parents agree might be an undesirable obstacle to the court's determination of what
is truly in the child's best interests.71

Joint custody presumptions, express and implied, contradict
and abrogate the "best interests of the child" standard. The basis of the "best interests" standard is a case-by-case determination where the court's decision is based on the facts of the particular case rather than an assumption or "presumption" of
what is in the best interests of all children.f•
69. See statutes cited supra note 67.
70. See "Friendly Parent Provisions," infra notes 76-92 and accompanying text.
71. STANDING Co MM. REp. No. 706.8, COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 1979-1980 Seas. (Hawaii) (March 10, 1980) (statement of Hon. Betty M. Vitousek, Senior Judge, Hawaii
Family Court) (opposing the portion of S. 2419 which would create a joint custody presumption when both parents agree).
72. "In the end, as in every child custody decision, it is the welfare of the children
which governs and each case will tum on its individual facts and circumstances." Dodd
v. Dodd, 93 Misc. 2d 641, 403 N.Y.S.2d 401, 402 (1978).
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The use of "best interests" language in "presumption" statutes is a play on words which avoids confronting the fact that
the "best interests" teRt has iii fact been supplanted. As most
experts agree, "ideally there should be no presumption for or
against joint custody, and each case should be decided on the
basis of its . . . facts.''''
The assumption that joint custody is appropriate or workable in all or most cases is unrealistic. Joint custody, at a minimum, requires that parents are able to communicate and willing
to put aside their personal differences. This cannot be assumed
of most parties who are in the middle or aftermath of divorce.'·

B.

ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS: JOINT CUSTODy-RELATED

Most joint custody legislation does not simply grant courts
the authority or power to award joint custody. Instead, the legislation usually contains various additional provisions, both related and unrelated to the joint custody issue. Those provisions
that are directly related to joint custody serve to increase the
pressure on courts to award joint custody. Four of these provisions, that were identified by a survey of all joint custody legislation, will be discussed: "friendly parent" provisions, provisions
setting higher evidentiary standards in custody proceedings, requirements that courts must state in writing their reasons for
denying joint custody, and "modification at any time"
provisions.
Many provisions included in joint custody legislation have
little or nothing to do with the joint custody issue. These provisions, to a large extent, serve to confuse the pertinent joint custody provisions at issue. In addition, these "unrelated" provisions seem to promote erosion of the custodial parent's rights
vis-a-vis the rights of the noncustodial parent. Consequently,
four "unrelated" provisions will also be discussed: accountings
by the custodial parent, "no removal of child from family home"
provisions, "access to records" provisions, and "minimum visitation" requirements.
73. Legislative Reform, supra note 6, at '1:1.
74. "The experience of most lawyers is that the typical client is embittered during
and after divorce and is not prepared to accept the continuing contact with the other
parent that joint custody requires." Legislative Reform, supra note 6, at 27.
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"Friendly Parent''7G Provisions

Some joint custody statutes and much of the recent legislation includes a "friendly parent" provision.?8 This provision directs the courts to consider which parent would be more likely to
allow "frequent and continuing contact" with the other parent
in determining who should be awarded sole custody as an alternative to joint custody.?? Some statutes and bills include an express legislative declaration or finding that "the public policy of
the state is to assure minor children of frequent and continuing
contact with both parents" after separation or divorce.T8
While the concept expressed by the "friendly parent" provision may be important and long-overdue, the practical effect of
the provision is to promote the use of the custody issue-and
thus, the children-as bargaining tools in divorce. This was, according to James Cook, who drafted the California joint custody
statute, the purpose of the "friendly parent" provision: "It's a
new twist on an old game called keepaway .... We've tried to
put a new handicap on the game by requiring the court to favor
the most cooperative parent.''''·
When only one parent seeks joint custody, the court, pursuant to the "friendly parent" provision, may favor or give preference to that parent in a sole custody award. The potential for
abuse is clear: "Joint custody will become an issue for barter, a
bargaining lever to be used to compel financial and other capitulation by the parent who believes that the child's best interests
will be served by stability and continuity and not by shuttling
back and forth. "80 The provision encourages and promotes bad
faith requests for joint custody, made solely for the purpose of
bartering on other issues.
75. This is the author's term.
76. See statutes in California, Florida, Idaho, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New
Hampshire and Pennsylvania (citations in Appendix A); and legislation in Alaska, Dis·
trict of Columbia, Illinois, Maryland, Missouri, New York, New Jersey, and South Carolina (citations in Appendix B).
77. CAL. CIV. CODE § 46OO(a) (West Supp. 1982); see also MONT. CODB ANN. § 40·4·
223(2) (1981); and legislation in New Jeney, New York, and South Carolina (citations in
Appendix B).
78. CAL. CIV. CODE § 46OO(a) (West Supp. 1982); see also, MONT. CODE ANN. § 40·4·
223(2) (1981). See generally Appendix B, col. B·l.
79. Dullea, supra note 44.
SO. Cohen, supra note 44. See also Levy & Chambers, supra note 18, at 8·9.
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Parents who believe joint custody is not in their child's best
interests will either "agree" to joint custody or "bargain." Few
will risk going into court against a parent seeking joint custody.
Children suffer either way-by an unworkable joint custody arrangement or by the custodial parent's "bartering away" of
financial resources necessary for the child's support.
Finally, the court's power to determine custody based on
the child's "best interests" is circumvented. Instead, the court
will be faced with a fait accompli: a joint custody "agreement"
that it must acceptS1 or a property settlement agreement that
does not adequately provide for the child's financial well-being.1I
Battered women's advocates have strongly opposed
"friendly parent" provisions because of the dangers they present
to clients and their children. The impact of this provision on
battered women cannbt be discounted when one realizes how serious and widespread wife abuse is in our society: "[H]alf of all
wives will experience some form of spouse-inflicted violence during their marriage, regardless of race or socioeconomic status. "Ia
Advocates point out that "[T]he presumption that continuing contact with the [abusive] father is in the best interests of
the child . . . is to discount the harmful effects such a role
model may have on both the individual and on the perpetuation
of violence in our system."84
The "friendly parent" provision also guarantees the batterer
continuing contact with his victim. As advocates point out, divorce and separation do not end battering. Studies reveal that
violence often increases when the abusive spouse realizes he is
81. See supra text accompanying notes 66·74.
82. Courts are generally bound by the parties' written property settlement agreements. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 48OO(a) (West Supp. 1982).
83. REPORT OF NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES AND THE UNITED STATES CONFERBNCE OF
MAYORS, cited in LANGLEY & LEVY, WIFE BBATING - THE SILENT CRlSBS 4 (1977). See
generally, MARTIN, BATTERED WIVES 10-22 (1976); Woods, Litigation on Behalf of Battered Women, 5 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP. 8, 11-13 (1978).
84. Hearings on A. 1471, Comm. on the Judiciary, Law, Public Safety and Defense,
1980 Sess. (New Jersey, 1980) (testimony of Diane Palladino, Director, Women Helping
Women, Abused Women's Services, Middlesex County, N.J.) (July 24,1980) [hereinafter
cited as N.J. Hearings}. The testimony is available from the National Center on Women
and Family Law, 799 Broadway, Room 402, New York. N.Y. 10003.
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losing control over his victim." Thus, "[ w]omen in this situation
may not be cooperative in 'assuring frequent and continuing
contact' . . . . [T]he abusive parent may use this [provision] to
provide the court with evidence as to why he or she should be
granted sole custody, thus placing the children in the care of an
abusive parent.""
Absent child or wife abuse, legal and mental health professionals are beginning to recognize that children need meaningful
and continuing relationships with both parents after divorce or
separation." "Friendly parent" provisions may reflect these concerns. While fathers' rights groups insist that this need can only
be fulfilled by a joint custody order," legal and mental health
professionals point out that "meaningful association with both
parents is common under the traditional sole custody-subject to
visitation formula"" where courts award substantial visitation
rights to the noncustodial parent." Parents who are committed
to sharing the raising of their children and are emotionally able
to co-parent, do not require a joint custody order to do so. In
fact, in two studies of children in joint custody arrangements,·1
none of the families studied had or were operating under joint
custody court orders; all orders were for sole custody-visitation.
As two legal experts have noted: "In a sense, therefore, some of
the agitation for joint custody really involves status-seeking 88
legal custodian (or co-custodian); or 'one-upmanship' .
u ..

2. Evidentiary Standards
Custody determinations in most states are based upon a
85. UNIV. or NEW HAMPSHIRK, FAMILY VIOLltNC& RilsBARcH PROORAM, FORCBD Sa 1M
MARRIAGE: A PRELIMINARY REPORT 1 (1980) (D. Finkelor & K. YUo).
86. N.J. Hearings, supra note 84 (testimony of EUen Koteen, Vice President, New
Jersey Coalition for Battered Women).
87. Viable Alternative, supra note I, at 24. But .ee, GoLD8TB1H, FREUD & SoLNlT,
BEYOND THE BEST INTBRBSTS or THE CHILD (1973).
88. A Voice for Divorced Fathers, Equal Rightl for Fathers of New York State,Inc.,
Newsletter, May-June, 1980.
89. Viable Alternative, supra note 1, at 27.
90. This is, in fact, what some supporters of the joint cuatody concept envision as a
joint custody arrangement! See supra note 24 and accompanyilll test.
91. Arbarbanel, Shared Parenti,., After Separation or Diuorce: A Study of Joinl
Custody, 49(2) AM. J. ORTHOPSYCH. 320 (1979); Steinman, The Ezperience of Children in
a Joint Custody Arrangement: A Report of Q Study, 51(3) AM. J. OItTHOPSYCH. 403
(1981).

92. Viable Alternative, supra note I, at 31.
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"best interests" standard.lla The court does not have to go to the
extreme of finding one parent unfit in order to award custody to
the other parent. This standard permits the parents and court to
concentrate on the child's needs rather than the parents'
faults. H
However, some joint custody legislation includes provisions
that mandate standards of proof beyond "best interests."" A
party 'opposing joint custody, under this legislation, must meet
the higher standard of proof in order to prevail. That joint custody may simply not be the best arrangement for the child is
insufficient to avoid the joint custody order.
Presumption and preference statutes are the typical example of these new and higher proof standards. However, legislation in Michigan and Massachusetts contemplated even heavier
proof standards to ayoid a joint custody order. The recently enacted Michigan statute" provides for mandatory joint custody
when the parents have agreed to this arrangement. The court
can only avoid a joint custody order if "clear and convincing evidence" establishes that joint custody is not in the child's best
93.

"A divorce court . . . should . . . take into consideration all
the circumstances of each particular case and dispose of the
children in such manner as may appear best calculated to secure for the,n proper care and attention as well as education.
In other words, the welfare of the child[ren) is the chief
consideration.
Annot., 24 AM. JUR. 2D 783 (1966). Many states, by statute, delineate the factors to be
considered under the "best interest" standard. E.g., MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 722.23(6)
(Supp. 1981).
Court opinions make it clear that interests of the child is a
94.
separate issue from parental fitness. An award of custody to
one parent does not legally imply that the other is unfit. Both
attorneys and psychotherapists need to help parents understand that custodial awards are for the benefit of the child and
not the parents, and that no stigma attaches to being noncustodial. The order is rather a demonstration of concern of the
needs of the children.
Levy & Chambers, supra note 18, at 8-9.
95. E.g., CAL. CIY. CODE § 4600.5 (West Supp. 1982) (presumption); MICH. COMP.
LAws ANN. § 722.23(6a) (Supp. 1981) (presumption and "clear and convincing evidence"). See also legislation in Massachusetts (H. 2631, S. 6172 (gross unfitness); H. 420,
S. 2059 ("unfit parent"); H. 1877, S. 2077 (presumption»; New Jersey (A. 407 (groea
unfitness of parent»; New York (A. 2385 (presumption»; Oregon (H. 2538 (presumption»; South Carolina (H. 3248 (presumption». For citations, see Appendices A and B,
col. B-l.
96. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 722.23(6) (Supp. 1981).
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interests. The use of "best interests" language is misleading.
Proof that a sole custody order would be the best or even a better arrangement for the child may be inadequate to overcome
the "clear and convincing evidence" standard. The difficulty of
overcoming this standard of proof was illustrated in In re
Abdullah 97 where an Illinois appellate court found that a man's
conviction for murdering his wife (the child's mother) was not
"clear and convincing evidence" of depravity or unfitness so as
to deny him custody of his child. 87.1
In Massachusetts, three joint custody bills were introduced
in the 1980 session, each ennunciating a different burden of
proof. H. 2631/8. 6172 mandated joint custody where both parties consented unless there was proof that one parent was "so
grossly unfit as to cause danger to the child." H. 420/8. 2059
provided for mandatory joint custody (regardless of parties'
agreement) unless the party opposing the arrangement could
show the other parent to be "unfit." S. 1962, sponsored by the
Boston Bar Association, proposed that joint custody be ordered
so long as there was no finding or showing that the order went
against the child's best interests. The heavy burden of proving
"gross unfitness," or even the lesser "unfitness," places the parent opposing joint custody at a severe disadvantage in the courtroom. Courts are reluctant to label a parent unfit, especially
since most cases involve disputes between two legally "fit"
parents. 98
Most of these heavier proof standards have been restricted
(at least until now) to those cases where parents have agreed to
joint custody. The underlying purpose of these provisions is
probably to restrict courts from interfering with parents' wishes.
However, there are no express provisions included in these bills
which allow-or force-courts to examine agreements to see if
one of the parties agreed under duress or fear of losing cus97. 80 Ill. App. 3d 1144,400 N.E.2d 1063 (1980), rev'd 85 Ill. 2d 300, 423 N.E.2d 915
(1981).
97.1 Ed. note: In re Abdullah was reversed on appeal, the Dlinois Supreme Court
finding that the husband's conviction for murder was ample evidence of depravity, and
that placing the child in his custody was against the child's best interest. 85 Ill. 2d 300,
423 N.E.2d 915 (1981).
98. Bratt, supra note 32; Uviller, Fathers' Rights and Feminism: The Maternal
Presumption Revisited, 1 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 107, 127 (1978).
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tody.99 The likelihood that such duress or coercion will occur increases where the statute includes a "friendly parent"
provision. loo
Additionally, it is unclear what factors will permit the court
to disregard parents' joint custody agreements. What weight will
the child's wishes have?IOI What weight will be given to psychiatric, probation, medical or school reports that disapprove of the
joint custody arrangement? Under most of these higher proof
standards, such factors may not be sufficient to upset the joint
custody agreement.
Finally, these higher proof standards may foretell a trend
away from the "best interests" doctrine and case-by-case determination in custody disputes. The high degree of weight courts
are forced to give parental agreements under this type of legislation constitutes a radical change in custody law. Heretofore, parental contracts regarding their children have been unenforceable per se, although, of course, subject to consideration by
courts. Under these new and higher proof standards, parental
contracts, regardless of the circumstances under which they are
entered or their impact on the children involved, will be entitled
to extraordinary weight and preference. The court's traditional
position as parens patriae, lOll is, in effect, undermined.
Some legal and mental health professionals and parents
may view this trend as a positive step toward removing custody
from the adversarial system. However, such a view fails to acknowledge that "bargaining" over custody will remain, regardless of whether a court is involved. And, women and children,
who do not yet have equal bargaining power with men in this
society, will suffer. This was well-illustrated in a 1978 New York
joint custody case lOS where the court pointed out:
99. See supra notes 58·61 and accompanying text.
100. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 432 A.2d 63 (1981) (upholding a trial
court's sua sponte forced joint custody order not requested by either parent and opposed
by the children).
102. The role of the court (or state) as parens patriae stems from early Englieh
Common Law and is based on the state's paramount interest in protecting children
within its jurisdiction and acting for their welfare. H. CLARK, LAw or DOMESTIC RBLA·
TlONS §§ 17.1, 17·7 (1968).
103. Dodd v. Dodd, 93 Misc. 2d 641, 403 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1978).
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Dr. Dodd has been uncompromising and Mrs.
Dodd, while a participant in the frequent acrimonious quarrels, has acquiesced to her husband's
demands in large measure out of fear that her
husband's threats to remove the children, to
prove her an abusive mother and to withhold support, could be carried out with impunity . . . .
In the Dodd family, the father has dominated the
mother, has forced his views on her, threatened
her and belittled her. 1M

3. Mandatory Writing Required for Denial of Joint Custody

Joint custody "presumption legislation"IOo usually includes
the additional mandate that "[i]f the court declines to enter an
order awarding joint custody pursuant to this subdivision, the
court shall state in its decision the reasons for denial of an
award of joint custody."I06 This provision further encourages
courts to prefer joint custody over sole custody, and establishes
a record for appeal which, in effect, limits the court's discretion
in custody decisions. This provision underscores an assumption
that joint custody is appropriate in all or most cases and therefore the court does not need to explain its decision when joint
custody is ordered.
Courts do not generally have to explain their reasons for
custody decisions. All that is required, or stated in most cases, is
that the court has found the custodial parent "fit" and that the
particular award is in the child's best interests.
Requiring courts to explain their reasons and the factors
they considered in making all custody decisions has several benefits. Custody law will become clearer and more uniform as "factors" become better articulated. When lawyers and parents are
aware of the factors the court will consider, settlement is encouraged and extensive and frivolous litigation avoided.
104. rd. at 647-48, 650, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 408, 501.
105. See Joint Custody PreferencelPresumption, supra notes 66-74 and accompany~~

.

106. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600.5(a) (West Supp. 1982) (emphasis added). See statutes
in Connecticut, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire; and legislation in Alaska.
District of Columbia, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania and
South Carolina (citations at Appendices A and B). But see MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. I
722.23(6a) (Supp. 1981).
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However, mandatory written explanation only when joint
custody is denied, rather than in all custody decisions, merely
pressures the court to opt for joint custody as the easy solution,
rather than the best solution, to a difficult problem. Given the
backlog of cases in court, judges may choose the easy way out:
Joint custody avoids another written statement. Judges may opt
for joint custody, even when they believe it is not in a child's
best interest, in order to avoid further disruption to the child by
continued litigation and appeals. While joint custody is an appealing concept, it should not, as Judge Shea in Dodd v. Dodd lo,
pointed out, be used to escape an agonizing choice or decision.
This writing requirement, by applying only when the court denies joint custody, encourages "escape" rather than careful deliberation and decision.
Finally, it would be more realistic to require courts to explain in writing why they order joint custody, rather than why
they deny it. IOB Joint custody requires, at the very least, two parents who are not hostile to each other and who are able to communicate and make joint decisions. Since it can hardly be assumed that this describes most spouses at the time of divorce, it
should not be assumed when children are involved. l09
4. Modification "At Any Time" Provisions

Several joint custody statuies and bills include a provision
that "any order for the custody of the minor child or children
. . . may . . . be modified at any time to an order of joint custody."uO As with most of the additional provisions contained in
joint custody legislation, the "modification at any time" encourages and promotes the joint custody resolution over that of sole
custody. Specifically, parents with sole custody orders are en107. 93 Misc. 2d 641, 643, 403 N.Y.S.2d 401, 404 (1978).
108. See, e.g., MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 722.23(6a)(l) (Supp. 1981) (requiring the
court to "state on the record the reasons for granting or denying a request" of joint
custody by either parent).
109. "The belief that parents who are otherwise unwilling to cooperate will somehow
be inspired to do 80 because of joint custody reflects magical thinking." Benedek &
Benedek, Post-Divorce Visitation, A Child's Right, 16 AM. ACAD. CHILD PSVCH. J. 256,
257 (1977).
110. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 571.45.l(d) (Supp. 1981); see also statutes in California.
Connecticut, Nevada. New Hampshire. New Mexico. Pennsylvania, and legislation in
District of Columbia, Maryland, Miesouri. New Jersey, New York and South Carolina
(see Appendices A and B, Col. B-4, for citations).
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couraged to return to court for a modification to joint custody.
The provision constitutes a radical change in custody law because it abrogates the "change of circumstances" standard traditionally required for custody modification.
The "change of circumstances" doctrine, with its attendant
proof burdens, seeks to protect and promote the child's welfare
by preserving the stable home environment created since the
original decree. The doctrine seeks to minimize continued and
frivolous custody litigation by requiring the party seeking modification to prove both that a change has occurred since the original decree, and that the change renders the original arrangement
and order no longer in the child's best interests. lII Thus,
"changes" which do not operate to the detriment of the child do
not theoretically constitute a "change in circumstances" sufficient to justify a custody modification. Factors constituting a
change in circumstances include, but are not limited to, changes
in the custodial parent's mental and moral fitness,1II religious
factors,113 the child's physical environment, IU the child's preference,116 one party's residence (e.g., a move out of state),118 remarriage by one of the parties,117 and alienation of the child's
affection from the noncustodian by the custodial parent. 11I
The unfettered power to challenge custody orders is in direct conflict with the deference courts give to original custody
decrees.118 By removing the burden of proving the existence of
any "change" factors, the "modification at any time" provision
Ill. Gilmore v. Gilmore, 530 P.2d 480 (Mont. S. Ct. 1975).
112. Goto v. Goto, 52 Cal. 2d 118,338 P.2d 450 (1959); Ashwell v. Ashwell, 135 Cal.
App. 3d 211, 286 P.2d 983 (1955).
113. Sullivan v. Sullivan, 141 Conn. 235, 104 A.2d 898 (1954).
114. Phillips v. Phillips, 48 Cal. App. 2d 404, 119 P.2d 736 (1940). But see, Anderson
v. Wilcox, 163 Neb. 883, 81 N.W.2d 314 (1957).
115. Allen v. Allen, 200 Or. 678, 268 P.2d 358 (1954). But ,ee, Strickler v. Strickler,
57 Ill. App. 2d 286, 206 N.E.2d 720 (1965).
116. Duncan v. Duncan, 293 Ky. 762, 170 S.W.2d 22 (1943); Freed v. Freed, 309
N.Y. 668, 128 N.E.2d 319 (1955).
117. Stewart v. Stewart, 41 Cal. 2d 447, 260 P.2d 44 (1953); McGuire v. McGuire,
190 Kan. 524, 376 P.2d 908 (1962).
118. Rutstein v. Rutstein, 324 S.W.2d 760 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 45 Wash. 2d 394, 275 P.2d 421 (1954).
119. Bistany v. Bistany, 66 A.D.2d 1026, 411 N.Y.S.2d 728 (1978); Underwood v.
Underwood, 38 Or. App. 213, 589 P.2d 1172 (1979); Doane v. Doane, 330 So. 2d 753 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
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enables the noncustodian to subject both the custodian and
child to endless and potentially frivolous litigation.
Significantly, the "modification at any time" provision may
only apply to modifications which seek joint custody.IIO Where
joint custody is originally ordered and one parent seeks a modification to sole custody, the traditional "change of circumstances"
standard may still apply. It may therefore be extremely difficult
to modify a joint custody order if, for example, one of the joint
custodians is not carrying out his or her responsibilities or the
parents are unable to agree. Additionally, if the original joint
custody order was forced l l l or made at a time when the parents
were hostile, continued hostility and disagreement may not constitute a "change in circumstances" sufficient to terminate an
unworkable joint custody arrangement.
C.

ADDmONAL PROVISIONS: NON-RELATED TO JOINT CUSTODY

1. AccountIng by CUstodial Parent

Joint custody legislation in two states expands the rights of
the noncustodial parent under a sole custody order. The noncustodial parent is given the unfettered power to challenge the custodial parent's use of support payments and, in effect, her or his
care of the child. Oregon's joint custody statute permits the
court "at any time" to "require an accounting from the custodian with reference to the use of the money awarded" for child
support. 111 New York's 1981 joint custody legislation included a
similar "accounting at any time" provision. 111 Neither provision
requires that there be evidence of misuse of funds or neglect of
the child. The accounting may be requested for a good reason, a
bad reason or no reason at all. Furthermore, there is no provision regarding payment of attorneys' fees to defend such actions.
This type of accounting provision creates the potential for
abuse and harassment of the custodial parent. It invites viola120. E.g., HAWAII REv. STAT. § 571.46.1(d) (Supp. 1981). See supro note 110 and
accompanying text. But Bee N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1(B) (Supp. 1981) (permitting
modification of a joint custody order upon the motion of one parent).
121. See "Joint Custody Upon Request of One Party," IIUpro notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
122. OR. REv. STAT. § 107.105 (1981).
123. H. 2385, 204th Legis., 1981 Sess. (New York) (died); A. 4166, S. 3255, 204th
Legis., 1981 Sess. (New York) (vetoed). See Appendix B.
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tion of court orders of support and will produce litigation over
small sums of money withheld and then disputed. Few custodial
parents have the time or expertise to become "accountants" able
to document each expenditure for the child. A noncustodial parent seeking to minimize or evade a support order can repeatedly
petition the court for an accounting. The custodial parent, faced
with incurring attorneys' fees to defend the action, or worse, losing custody because she cannot document or "justify" expenditures, may agree to waive support rights (or arrearages) to end
the harassment and legal proceedings.
Moreover, this type of provision contradicts the court's underlying assumption that the parent who has been awarded custody of the child is "fit" and will therefore adequately and properly provide for the child's needs. Accounting provisions
presume the opposite.
Accounting "at any time" provisions do not serve children's
best interests. Seventy-five percent of child support orders and
obligations are never met. I.. Five out of six AFDe families have
an absent father, two-thirds of whom are categorized as separated or divorced. III The increasing poverty of women and their
children has been attributed to the failure of fathers to meet
their support obligations: "Researchers have cited the growth in
poverty rates for families headed by females and the shrinkage
in poverty rates for those headed by males, mainly because women have been forced to support children alone and men have
been relieved of this duty."I .. Accounting provisions only add to
the ease with which child support obligations are already
avoided, and further relegate children of divorce to poverty
lifestyles.

2. "No Removal

0/ Child From Family Home" Provision

A joint custody bill introduced in New Jersey included a
provision that:
124. Women and Poverty, Women',luue, in Le,al Seruice. Practice, 14 CuAIuNoHOUD &Y. 1035, 1069-70 (1980-1981).
125. BUUAU or THa CIIN8US, U.S.
UNlTD STATa, 1978, at 361.

n.rr. or COMYBRCB, STA'I18TICAL ABlrntAcr or THa

126. Seal, A Decade of No-Fault Divorce: What it HOI Meant Financially for Women in California, 1 FAIL Anv., Spring 1979, at 10, 15.
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Unless the parents agree upon arrangements for
physical custody of the child, the child may not
be removed from the dwelling place which is the
family home at the time one of the parents moves
to another dwelling place to live separately, until
the issue of custody of the child is determined as
provided by law."'

Under this provision, pre-decree removal of the child could jeopardize the right to custody by the removing parent. Additionally,
the provision could be used by a parent to gain an advantage in
a custody dispute by, for example, filing for custody while the
child and other parent are away on vacation or following a weekend or overnight trip.
While the "no removal" provision has little nexus to joint
custody issues, it has serious ramifications for battered women.
As battered women's advocates in New Jersey testified:
Our experience has been that maAy women have
remained in the home to continue to be subjected
to beatings because they have been misinformed
by police that they cannot take their children
with them. lll
The vast majority of battered women will
simply not leave home-or even consider leaving
their home-if they cannot take their children
with them. Equally frightening is the prospect of
a parent not being permitted to remove his or her
children from the home when the other parent is
physically, psychologically, or sexually abusing
one or more of the children. To enact this section
lA. 1471] as law will cause the deaths of battered
women and children. I ••

The battered woman is placed in a "catch 22" by this type
of provision: To leave could jeopardize her custody case since
she would be violating the provision; to stay in a dangerous and
127. A. 1471, A. 407, 198th Legis., 1980·1981 Seas. (N.J.). See also Bill No. 4-424, I
2(b), 1981 Seas. (District of Columbia) (1982) (prohibiting removal "unless an immediate
threat to the children exists, as evidenced by a past record of child abUlle"). See infra
note 142 and accompanying text.
.
128. See N.J. Hearings. supra note 84.
129. See N.J. Hearings. supra note 84 (testimony of Ellen Koteen. Vice President,
New Jersey Coalition for Battered Women).
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violent home may imply that she is unable to care for and protect herself and her children. 110
The purpose of this uno removal" provIsion is unclear. It
may represent an attempt to prevent child-snatching. If so, it is
overbroad. A provision prohibiting removal from the jurisdiction, rather than the family home, would address the childsnatching problem without also endangering the safety and wellbeing of abused wives and children.
The provision may instead be an attempt to minimize the
disruption of children's lives (school, neighborhood, friends)
caused by the splitting of their parents and family. It is questionahle, however, whether keeping children in a home with two
hostile and uwarring" parents is any less disruptive than a move
to another residence.
Interestingly, the.uno removal" provision seems to contradict one of the basic tenets of joint custody. Joint custody emphasizes and, in fact, depends upon uflexibility" and the constant moving of children between two homes. ••• However, the
Uno removal" provision reverts to the traditional emphasis on
the child's need for stability and continuity of a one home
environment. III
130. The California Supreme Court recently upheld the permanent removal of a
child from both parents where the Cather had been convicted oC abusing the child. Despite evidence in the record that the mother and daughter maintained an intimate and
caring relationship, the court Cound the mother passive and dominated by her husband,
thus unable to protect the child from the Cather's continum, abuse. As the dissent
pointed out:
A finding that the mother WBI "too passive" in her relationahip with her husband and the use of the finding to justify
severance of the parent-child relationahlp raiaellOme serious
queationa in a pluraliatic society where the relationahip between husband and wife may vary according to cultural
background.
In re Angelia P., 28 Cal. 3d 908, 927, 623 P.2d 198, 209, 171 Cal. Rptr. 637, 648 (1981).
131. Proponents claim that joint custody offen "flesibility" to parents by, Cor eumpie, relieving the BOle custodian of the full-time job oC childrearing. Advocatea Curther
contend that this "flesibility" factor more than compenaatea for the disruption and confusion joint custody causes in the child'a environment and should be esploited to the
Culleat. See, e.g., Roman, The Dilpoaable Parent, CONCD.. Ore. Rsv., Dec. 1977, at 1.
132. Theae facton have alwaya been paramount under the "best intereats" teat.
"Stability in the human Cacton affecting a child's emotional liCe and development is easential." Annot., 92 A.L.R.2d 699 (1950).
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3. Access to Records Provision
Several joint custody statutes and bills provide noncustodial
parents with unrestricted access to all "records and information"
pertaining to their children.· .. This may include medical, dental,
school and psychiatric records. This provision is, in part, unnecessary since, under federal law,," noncustodial parents are already guaranteed access to their children's school records.
This provision is extremely dangerous to battered women,
children, and those persons and agencies who assist them such
as families and shelters. There are no standards for limiting an
abusive parent's right of access to these records. By exercising
this right, an abusive noncustodial parent will be able to locate
the child's residence and school, as well as the custodial parent's
address of employment. Because the "right to access" is usually
mandatory, it is unclear if the court may, in its discretion, limit
access where there is evidence or a history of battering or child
abuse .• 111 The "record access" provision in New York's 1981 joint
custody bill·" was strongly opposed by battered women's advocates."T As a result, the bill was amended to deny access to nODcustodial parents where protection orders were in effect, or to.
parents whose rights had been terminated or who had been adjudicated abusive or neglectful. 1aa However, as advocates pointed
out, these amendments were not only insufficient to protect victims, but exhibited the Legislature'S lack of understanding and
consideration of the problems faced by battered women and
133. "[A]ccesa to recorda and information pertaining to a minor child, including but
not limited to medical, dental and achool recorda, ,hall not be denied to a parent because such parent ill not the child'. custodial parent." CAL. CIV. CoDE § 46OO.5(g) (West
Supp. 1982) (emphaaill added). See .tatutea in Florida, Idaho, Masaachusetts, Montana,
Nevada, New Hampahire; and lqialation in AJaaka, Connecticut, minoill, Miasouri, New
Jersey and New York. (citatioDl in Appendicea A and B, col. C-4).
134. The Family Education Right. and Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, tit.
V, § 513(a), 88 Stat. 671 (codified at 20 U.s.C. 112321 (1976».
135. See Pennsylvania'. new .tatute, 1981 Pa. Laws No. 115 § 10(b), which espressly
grants the court dilCretionary power to deny access, and § 10(c) which forbids the court
from ordering "that the addreaa of a shelter for battered spouses and their dependent
children or otherwise confidential records of a domestic violence counselor be dillclosed
to the defendant or hie counael or any party to the proceeding."
136. S. 3256, A. 4166, 204th Legia., 1981 Seas. (New York) (vetoed).
137. NEW YORK &rAft GoVERNOR'S TASK FORCB ON DoMBSTIC VIOLBNCB, COALmON
FOR ABUSBD WOMBN,

INc.,

LBoAL AcnON ON DoWBSTlC VIOLENCB

(1980).

138. S. 3256B, A. 4166B, 204th Legia. 1981 Seas. (New York) (introduced Feb. 23,
1981) (amending N.Y. Do... RBL. LAw § 240).
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children.
Although the [amendments] represent an attempt
to cure an obvious defect allowing access to a

shelter or safe home, it requires an adjudication
and does not contemplate the myriad of cases
where no formal abuse, neglect or parental termination or protective order proceeding has occured.
Specifically it ignores the many child abuse and
neglect cases opened by child protective agencies
and not brought to court because of inartful collection of necessary evidence, or a lack of staff
and services. Further, it does not include the
many abuse cases where children recant their initial testimony on the discovery that their removal
from the home will be the outcome and therefore
the abuse petitions are dismissed. Moreover, the
new protective orders amendment fails to consider violent families where orders have lapsed,
been dismissed on consent, were never requested
. . . . Thus access to the shelter location is still
permitted in all of the above instances. I . .

The practical effect of record-access provisions is confused
by the extremely broad scope of information available under
them. The provision makes accessible not only "records," but
any "information pertaining to the child. "1.0 However, the language of the provision makes clear that a noncustodial parent's
right to access applies only if the denial of access is based solely
on status, i.e., that he or she is a noncustodial parent. Thus, the
right of access guaranteed by this provision does not, and should
not, apply when denial is based on other recognized reasons or
rights of custodial parents and children, such as constitutional
rights of privacy or statutory rights (e.g., physician-patient
privilege).
4. "Minimum Visitation" Requirement

South Carolina's 1980 joint custody legislation included the
provision that "[iJn no case may the courts grant any less access
to the child to the noncustodial parent than forty-eight hours
139. Letter from Meg O'Regan-Cronin, Esq., Executive Director, Coalition for
Abused Women, Inc. to Governor's Counsel's Office (June 10, 1981) (recommending veto
of joint custody bill).
140. See supra note 133.
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per week, one-half of all school holidays and forty-five days during the summer unless there is a proven threat of physical harm
to the child. "141
This provision constitutes a complete abandonment of the
"best interest" standard. It cannot be presumed that such a
rigid formula is in most or every child's best interests. Because
the provision only permits limitation of visitation when there is
a threat of physical harm to the child, those children who are
psychologically and emotionally abused by the noncustodial parent will be subject to the visitation prescribed by the provision.14I Further, the requirement that threats of physical harm
be "proven" does not take into account the difficulty of proving
child abuse. 1f8 The only "proof' in many cases will be the custodial parent's allegations of abuse or threats of abuse. Since this
parent is the moving party seeking limitations on visitations
these allegations may be viewed by the court as suspect.I "
The provision, by permitting deviation only when there is a
threat of physical abuse to the child, fails to recognize that it is
not in a child's best interests to have frequent and continuing
contact with a parent who abuses the other parent. lfe Husbands
who batter their wives are, under the provision, guaranteed fre·
quent and continuing access to their victims. The statute espressly forbids courts from exercising their discretion 80 as to
protect battered wives and their children.
Under this legislation, the custodial parent's needs and
schedule become subservient to the dominant visitation rights of
141. H. 3248, 1979-1980 Seas. (South Carolina) (empbaais added). See AppendU B.
142. Generally, courts have the power to limit or suspend visitation when It endangers the child's physical, mental or emotional health. See e.g., Wrs. STAT. § 247_24&
(1981).
143. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
144. In a 1977 Louisville, Kentucky cue, Mimi Jolicour loet custody of her fiveyear-old daughter to her ex-husband when she sought to terminate his visitation righta
because of evidence he was sexually molesting the child. Besides Ms. Jolicour's teetimony, there was supporting testimony by two doctors who treated the child. Not only
did the judge not believe Ms. Jolicour, but he transferred IOle custody to the father mel
forbade Ms. Jolicour from visiting or communicating with the child. Henry, Father Molests Child; Gets ClUtody. em Oua BACKS, March 1980; Who', Minding Fatherf,
PLEXUS. Dec. 1980 at 9, col. 1.
145. See supra text accompanying note 84. Battered woman's advocates describe
children of violent homes as haviDg "the feelings of instability and insecurity of childreD
who have sustained trauma." N.J. Hearing" supra note 84.
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the noncustodial parent. No provision is included whereby the
custodial parent can force the noncustodial parent to exercise
these "rights," yet interference with this rigid schedule by the
custodial parent may result in a loss of custody. Nor is the economic impact of this provision addressed in the legislation. If
the noncustodial parent lives or moves out of state, the custodial
parent may have to share the costs of this "right."
This provision is an extreme example of legislators' unprecedented concern for, and protection of, the rights of the noncustodial parents-over and above the needs and best interests of
either the child or the parent responsible for the day-to-day care
of the child.
III. CONCLUSION
Legal and mental health authorities generally concur that
joint custody is only appropriate when both parents want the
arrangement and are able to cooperate in joint decisionmaking.
Such cases are in the minority, and those parents will have an
informal joint custody arrangement regardless of court order.
Thus, the current legislation is directed at, and would largely
affect, those parents who are not in agreement. These are the
very cases which experts agree are unsuitable for joint custody
and where, in fact, it would be detrimental to the child's best
interests.
Ostensibly, joint custody equalizes the rights and responsibilities of childraising between parents. This is not, however, the
intent or effect of the legislation now being introduced across
the country. Instead, this legislation serves to expand the rights
of the parent who is not responsible for the day-to-day job of
raising children. The non-caretaking parent is given "equal"
rights or control when he/she does not contribute equally to the
day-to-day care and support of the child, either pre-divorce or
post-divorce. Further, forced legal joint custody only serves to
interfere with the primary caretaker's ability to make the decisions needed to carry out her responsibilities to the child.
The current joint custody trend is, in effect, an attack on
women who have been, and wish to continue to be, the primary
caretakers of their children. Their past assumption of the daily
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care and responsibility for children is denied any value or credit.
The current joint custody trend will not lead to equality between the sexes. Sexism does not end when women lose rights or
lose custody of their children. Forced joint custody, like forced
sterilization and forced pregnancy, is a denial of women's right
to control their lives.
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1982

s

TEx. FA... CODE ANN. § 14.06
(Vernon 1974 & Sllpp. 1982)
WIS. STAT.
§ 247.24(1)(b) (1981)

s

~

s

s

s

s

s

s

s

s

s

s

s

s

s

s

s

s

~

joint I_I without joint phywieaJ

s
·10 months tn.1 period required

s·

I

s

s

1979

s

1978

s

s

s

s

·prohibits diocl""ure of battered women.o\
ohelter addreooeo and counoeloro

s·

I
I

--

-

KEY:
A. TYPE OF JOINT CUSTODY STATUTE (See test pp. 545 to 553).
1. Option
2. Option Only When Parties in Agreement
3. Upon Request of One Party
4. PreferencelPresumption

_

joint cuotody "meano equal fi«:hts and reo_ibiliti~" __
__ ___
__

I

c...

o

~

C')

c::
00

a
tj

0<

B. ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS: JOINT CUSTODY-RELATED (See test pp. 553 to 563).
1. "Friendly Parent" Provision
2. Evidentiary Standardo
3. Mandatory Writing for Denial of Joint Cuotody
4. Modification" At Any Time" ProvisIon
C. ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS: NON-RELATED TO JOINT CUSTODY (See test pp. 563 to 570).
1. Accounting Provisions
2. "No Removal" of Child From Home
3. Access to Recordo Provisiono
4. uMinimum Visitation" Requirement
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APPENDIX B: JOINT CUSTODY LEGISLATION (Status as of March 1982)

(I)

STATE

BILL #

SESSION

STATUS

UJ"

I.

i

AK

o

ARK

~

~

CA
CA
CA
CA

cr
cr
cr
Dial.

Col.

ru.
ru.
IDAHO

IL
IL

KAN

HB 210,
ROIlen-Hess
HB 52,
Sherman
AB 1706,
Kapilof
AB 2202,
Imbrecht
AB 2197,
Imbrecht

P

X

1981

D

x

1982

P

x

x·

x

x

x

1982

P

x

x

x

X

X

D

1980
1981

D

1981

F

1981

F

1981

F

1982

P

HB 1440,
Gordan

19110

D

"

HB ISO·

1981

D

"

Epland

SB 123,
O'LearY
HB 6464,
MoaJey

SB 983,

Smitll
lIB 4-424
Ray

SB 1262,
Judie. Com.
HB 0665,
Catania
HB 3405,
YOUN[

HB 2706 (Am.)
Judie; Com.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol12/iss3/2

4.

B. Additional Prouuiona:
Joi t CUlt dy-Rd tH
2.
4.
I.
3.

1981·
1982

1980
1981

lIB 3480,

A. Ty~ of Joint
rutod)l Statut
2.
3.

1982

D

1981
1982

P

1980

F

1982

p

x

X

x

X

x

X

C. Additional Prouuiono:
Non- .latH 0 Joi,. Cu.t.
4.
I.
2.
3.

OTHER (explain'

"

"

•

".

"
"

x
x

To exemption provision

Z

• Joint legal aM joint pbyxical only

>

Joint '-'!phyxical defined

"

"

~

"

•

~
"

•

"

"
x

"
x

~

~

"

"

"
"

o

Z

"

"

·ddrimmt fimIinI; no child oupport
...... ioInt cuotadY OIdend

·~.7FLR7m4

"

o

C

"
"
"

"

o
otr.2

LepJ reoidence cIeoipation

"
"
"

",..

t"

x

X

Cl1

-l

5
~
~

Joint IepI without joint phyaical

~
I-"

t-:)

c;,

~
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.....

APPENDIX B (Continued)
A. TylW

SESSION

~...tody

Joinl
Stotut

0/

B. Additiona / f>roIUio ...:
Joi t Cuot dy-Re/ ted
1.
23.
4.

STATE

RILL #

KY

HB «8,
Guenthner

1982

P

s·

LA

HB 1691.
Byrnes

1980 .
1981

F

s

MD

SB 398.

1982

P

MD

HB 1296.
Hughes

1982

F

MD

HB 1418

1982

F

MD

SB 1771960.
WelBh

1982

F

MD

SB 755.
Curnn

1982

F

MD

HB 352,
Shapiro

198C
1981

D

MA

H 3013.
Hicks

1982

P

MA

H 2631/86172
Denucci

1980

F

s

s

MA

H 18771S2I117
Vimeau

1980

F

"

MA

H42011S2059.
LeClair

1980

F

"

"
"

MN

SB 1569.
Johnson

1982

P

It·

MO

HB 44.
Christian

1981

D

"

MO

HB 1132.
Christian

1982

P

s

MO

SB 683.
Wbarins

1982

P

STATUS
1.

Boc=r
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~--

2-

3.

4.

t.O

C. AdditioN" Proci.io...:
Non- e/otrd 0 Join Cu.t.
4.
1.
3.
2-

~
......

OTHER lesplainl
·"Joint ....tady
l(l"allted"

ohall

be

libenlly

s
s

s

s

's

s

s

s

s

s

s

s
Joint legal without joint phyoical

s

s

s
s

c:...

• Joint IepJ

s

onlY

~

C"l

s

c::

·"oint IepJ on\)'

s'

"

s

"

~

'Reported et 8 FLR 2278

"
"
"

Joint IepJ without joint phyoiad
s·

s

s·

"

• Detriment findi. .

s
s

·Detriment findi..,

~
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APPENDIX 8 (Continued)
A.

STATE

BILL

SESSION

#

STATUS
I.

(1)-

t"".

~

NJ

A 122.
Visotchkv

f

NJ

A 407.
Paolella

1980 •
1981

NJ

A 1471.
Visotchky

1980 •
1981

NY

S ~/A 10721.
Luher

1982

Vetoed

NY

A 41661S 3255.
Luber

1981

Vetoed

NY

A 9369/S 7964.
Lasher

1980

D

NY

H 2385.
Behan

1981

D

OH

HB 1076.
BovIe

1979 .
1980

F

HB 2538.

1979 •
1980

D

1980 •
1981

D

1980

D

1980

D

1979

D

OR
PA
PA
PA

RI

Ridwda
S 141.

Furno
HB 2394.

MeKeIJey
S 1282.

Gekaa
SB 1023.

CoateUo

1982

P
F

H 3248.
Bradley

1979 •
1980

D

TX

HB 1508.
GiUey

1981

D

SB 3248.
Haley

1981 •
amend
1982

----

---
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2.

P

•
•

B. AddU;"",,1 ProuUiDIu:
Joi " CuI rdy-R~I IH

of Joint

Slalul
3-

4.

I.

2.

' 3.

4.

•

•
•

•

•

•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

F

SC

WA

Ty~

ulod~

x

"

•
•

•

•
•

•

•

•
•
•
•

"

•

•

•

•
••

•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

CIt

-.3

c.

AtUiliotuJl

Non· dalH
I.
2.

•

0

0)

I'rouuu.n.:
Joi", Cut.
3.

OTHER (e.plmn)

o
o

4.

btz:l

•

•
•
•
•

•

•

•
•

•

•
•

Z

•

I

•
•
•

,·"Re...nabl. and juot" standard

tz:l

I

I

•

o
~

I

I

c::

Z

-<
~
00

~

t""

~

•
•
•

•

•

•

>

~

•
•

"-<

'<
tz:l

Joint IepJ without joint phyoical

tz:l
~

"

•

~

Child IUPport pnm.HIDI

!

~

Cit

•

Court muol opeclfy raidenc:e of child

~
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KEY:
A. TYPE OF JOINT CUSTODY STATUTE (See test pp. 64& to 65.'11.
I. Option
.
2. Option Only When Parties In Apeement
3. Upon Request of One Party
4. PreCerence/Presumption

"STATUS KEY:"
P-pendillll

D-died in ...... mitlee
F-Called

....
~

-

B. ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS: JOINT CUSTODY·RELATED (See \eSt pp. 65.1 to 56.11.
\. "Friendly Parent" Provision
2. Evidentiary Standards
3. Mandatory Writi", Cor Denial of Joint CUBl<Jdy
4. Modification" At Any Time" Provision

C. ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS: NON·RELATED TO JOINT CUSTODY (See test pp. 56.1 to 5701.
\. Ac:countin« Provisions
2. "No RemoVal" of Child From Home
3. Acxeu to Recorda Provisions

4. "Minimum Visitation" Requirement

c...

o

~

(")

I
~

-oil
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